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TRIAL BY JURY, PETTY OFFENSES,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Clyde E. Jacobs*
I
Trial by jury and freedom from governmental oppression have been closely
intertwined in the American political experience, so much so that, of the nu-
merous procedural rights recognized in eighteenth-century America, the
right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions was the only procedural safeguard
guaranteed by the constitutions and bills of rights of all the original states. More-
over, although the framers of the federal Constitution omitted reference to most
traditional liberties and procedural rights in the document, they made explicit
provision' for jury trials in criminal cases. In 1788, Alexander Hamilton ex-
pressed the sentiment of the time as follows:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree on
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon trial by jury; or if
there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it
as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palla-
dium of free government. 2
The universal approbation which Hamilton credited to the right of trial by jury
in his own day did not, as we know, survive the following century. With the
possible exception of the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right of trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases has been the subject of more
controversy than any other constitutional safeguard.'
In recent years, the Supreme Court has sided with the champions of the
right to trial by jury in criminal cases. When the Court incorporated the sixth
amendment right to jury trial into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Duncan v. Louisiana,4 it restated, with elaboration, the sentiment cited
by Hamilton one hundred and eighty years before:
* Professor of Political Science, University of California, Davis. A.B. 1946, University of
Kansas; M.A. 1948, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 1952, University of Michigan.
I U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-22 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
3 A discussion of the debates waged over the merits of the jury system is beyond the scope
of this article. For a selective bibliography of the controversy see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JuRy at 4 n.2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as KALVEN & ZEISEL].
4 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
sustaining a conviction for simple battery upon summary trial of the accused. The maximum
punishment prescribed for the offense was two-years' imprisonment and a $300 fine. Under
Louisiana law the offense was not triable by jury, the state constitution providing as follows:
All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall . . .be tried by
the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor,
shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases,
in which punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom
must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by ajury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. LA. CONST. art. VII,§ 41.
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The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to
protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but
insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an in-
estimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sym-
pathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the
jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power - a reluctance to entrust
plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a
group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal
law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination
of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforce-
ment qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.5
A few earlier decisions6 of the Court contained dicta which clearly suggested
that the right of trial by jury was not bifiding upon the states, but the vitality of
these dicta had been seriously undermined in the decade preceding Duncan.
During this period a majority of the Court, while continuing to reject the argu-
ment that the fourteenth amendment incorporated all of the guarantees contained
in the Bill of Rights, sanctioned selective incorporation of specific guarantees.
This incorporation process had brought the majority of the fourth, fifth and sixth
amendment guarantees within the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
7
At the same time, evidence was accumulating that the Court ascribed high
value to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions. In a series of cases antedating
Duncan, increasingly rigorous standards were imposed to prevent discrimination
in the selection of jurors.' In other cases, the Court resisted the extension of sum-
5 Id. at 155-56.
6 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97
(1934); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
7 The guarantees incorporated prior to Duncan included: the right to compulsory process
to obtain witnesses (Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); the right to a speedy trial(Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)); the right to confront opposing witnesses(Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)); the right to trial by an impartial jury (Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965)); the right against self-incrimination (Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964)); the right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); the
right against cruel and unusual punishment (Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962));
the right against unreasonable search and seizure (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); the
right to a public trial (In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
Thus, at the time Duncan was argued, only a few of the criminal procedural safeguards
of the Bill of Rights had not yet been made binding upon the states. In addition to trial byjury, these included the right to a grand jury and the prohibition against double jeopardy.
The latter was subsequently incorporated in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
8 Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (racial discrimination); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954) (discrimination on the basis of national origin); Ballard v. United
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mary procedures to situations where trial by jury previously was available,9 and
extended the right of trial by jury to areas in which summary trials traditionally
had been permitted.10
New judicial doctrine- no less than the acquisition of new knowledge-
generally raises more questions than it settles. By imposing the trial by jury
guarantee of the sixth amendment upon the states, the Court invited, even
necessitated, further inquiry into the nature and latitude of that guarantee. As
long as the Constitution safeguarded trial by jury only in federal prosecutions,
opportunities for delineating the right were confined to a rather narrow range
of federal practices. But with the right now made binding upon the states, a
greater variety of trial procedures may be challenged as violative of the sixth
amendment; consequently, the contours of the righi to jury trial are being
developed and reworked with greater precision.
Despite the sweeping command of the sixth amendment and the broad
language of article III," the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that trial by
jury is guaranteed only in prosecutions for serious crimes. 2 Conversely, those
charged with so-called petty offenses may be tried summarily, if the law so pro-
vides."3 In Duncan this traditional doctrine was reaffirmed, without extensive re-
evaluation, the majority advancing familiar historical and policy arguments to
support its conclusion:
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) '(discrimination on the basis of sex). Virtually' contemporaneous
with its decision in Duncan, the Court barred one species of ideological discrimination when, in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), it held that a state may not, in capital cases,
exclude from juries persons having conscientious scruples against the death penalty - at least
where such persons do not signify that they would necessarily vote against imposition of that
penalty.
9 See, e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957),
reo'g on rehearing, Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956) and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S.
487 (1956); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). In these cases -the
Court disapproved of Congressional attempts to extend court-martial jurisdiction to certain
classes of civilians, in each case citing the denial of jury trial as one basis for requiring prosecu-
tion before an article III court.
10 In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), the Court, exercising its supervisory
powers, ruled that federal courts may not impose sentences exceeding six months for criminal
contempts unless the defendant is granted the right of trial by jury. Although Cheff did not
overrule Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (where the Court had reaffirmed the
validity of summary trial for criminal contempt, even though the punishment imposed was
severe), it is clear that the authority of Green was badly impaired. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968), decided on the same day as Duncan, the right to jury trial in state prosecu-
tions for serious criminal contempts was accorded constitutional status.
This trend toward enlargement of the right to trial by jury also appears in O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). In a 5 to 3 decision, the Court held that there is no court-
martial jurisdiction to try a serviceman for a crime which has no military significance where
the offense is committed off post and while the defendant was on leave.
Whether the right to jury trial will be extended still further - for example, to certain
juvenile court proceedings - remains in doubt. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28
(1969); In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11 The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury ....
Article III provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . ...
12 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts,
282 U.S. 63 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); qallan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540 (1888).
13 Id.
297
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So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the
Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the otherwise com-
prehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions. There
is no substantial evidence that the Framers intended to depart from this
established common-law practice, and the possible consequences to defend-
ants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to
outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial
administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive non-
jury adjudications. 14
While these arguments are not, as we shall presently see, invulnerable, the petty
offense exception to the constitutional guarantees of jury trial seems to have been
challenged within the Court in only two decided cases and, on those occasions,
in minority opinions. 5
In differentiating between offenses for which jury trials, unless waived, must
be granted and those for which bench trials may be provided, the Court tradi-
tionally fixed upon two determinants- the nature of the offense, and the
severity of the maximum punishment which might be inflicted for its commis-
sion.'6 Under this twofold test, an offense is deemed petty if it is not intrinsically
grave and if the authorized penalty is relatively light. The first of these deter-
minants is extremely vague, leaving to the Court nearly unfettered discretion,
and judicial resort to so-called objective criteria for evaluating the nature of the
offense has provided little clarification. In making its assessments, the Court has
rejected the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy as identical with the distinction be-
tween serious and petty offenses,' but has considered whether the offense is
malum in se or malum prohibitum,8 whether it was indictable at common law, "
whether it was of a kind triable summarily at the time the Constitution was
adopted,2" and whether it is defined by state statute or by municipal ordinance.2'
Despite the imprecision of this test, in cases where the Court has differenti-
ated between serious and petty crimes, the nature of the offense was always the
primary consideration. Prior to Duncan there was no case in which the Court
found the accused to be constitutionally entitled to a jury trial solely on the basis
of the penalty which might be imposed. In Duncan, however, it was precisely
this consideration which accounted for the Court's reversal of the conviction.
The Court did not discuss the nature of the offense involved (simple battery);
instead, it merely stated that "the penalty authorized by the law of the locality
may be taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments."' 2 The possibility
of imprisonment for as much as two years persuaded the Court that the crime
14 391 U.S. 145 at 160.
15 See Baldwin v. New York, 339 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black and Douglas, JJ., con-
curring in part); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633-34 '(1937) (McReynolds
and Butler, JJ., concurring).
16 E.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
17 E.g., Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
18 E.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 67 (1904).
19 E.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937); District of Columbia
v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
20 E.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 555 (1888). ,
21 E.g., Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891).
22 391 U.S. 145 at 160 (1968).
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was serious. The Court noted that offenses carrying punishments of up to six
months' imprisonment were deemed petty for purposes of federal prosecutions,23
but declined to draw a dividing line between petty and serious offenses.
In subsequent cases,24 the Court has clearly indicated that it now considers
the severity of the authorized penalty for the crime charged to be determinative
of an accused's right to a jury trial.2" And the Court has drawn a line between
petty and serious offenses at six months.2" In doing so, it has reaffinmed the
validity of the petty offense exception to the unqualified language of article III
and of the sixth amendment.
II
As previously noted, both historical and policy arguments have commonly
been adduced to support the conclusion that the literally unqualified commands
of article III and of the sixth amendment were designed to safeguard trial by
jury only in prosecution for serious crimes. Although this conclusion now seems
to be embedded too firmly in constitutional doctrine for outright repudiation,
the weaknesses of the supporting arguments warrant some redefinition of the
petty offense exception, as well as a reappraisal and modification of the test for
differentiating between serious and petty offenses.
The historical argument supporting the conclusion that trial by jury need
not be provided in prosecutions for minor offenses was first suggested by the
Court in Callan v. Wilson," and it was developed fully in an elaborate study by
Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran, published in 1926."s Essentially, this
argument is based upon two propositions: first, that at the time the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights were adopted, the states followed the already traditional
English and colonial practice of providing only bench trials for those charged
with certain minor offenses; and second, that an intention to deny Congress the
power to provide for nonjury trials in similar situations is not to be imputed to
those who framed and ratified the Constitution and, later, the sixth amendment,
despite the unqualified language which. they employed in guaranteeing trial
by jury.
The correctness of the first of these propositions is not to be doubted, for
there is massive evidence that the states, like the American colonies, made statu-
tory provision for summary trials of certain offenses. But the correctness of the
proposition that the authors of the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury in-
tended to sanction statutory provision for bench trials in federal prosecutions
for petty offenses is much more doubtful. Without thoroughly recanvassing the
objections to this assumption, which have been forcefully stated by George Kaye,2 9
23 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See also Cheff v. Schnockenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
24 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147
(1969).
25 A footnote to the Baldwin opinion suggests that the nature of the crime may still be
relevant in determining whether it is serious or petty. 399 U.S. at 69 n.6 (1970).
26 Id. at 69.
27 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
28 Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of
Trial by Jury, 39 H.Av. L. Ray. 917 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter and Corcoran].
29 See Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 245 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Kaye].
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we may note that if an exception in favor of summary trials were intended, the
draftsmen of article III and of the sixth amendment chose singularly inept lan-
guage to convey that meaning."s Moreover, the fact that summary trials were
sanctioned by the states in face of their own constitutional guarantees of trial by
jury is not persuasive with respect to the scope of the federal right -as the
Frankfurter-Corcoran article maintained -unless the state constitutional pro-
visions were fairly comparable with those of article III and of the sixth amend-
ment. But, in fact, in most instances, the state guarantees were much less com-
prehensively phrased, and such restricted phraseology might have been intro-
duced by the framers if they had intended to sanction summary proceedings in
some criminal cases."
Proponents of the petty offense doctrine do not, however, rest their case on
history alone. Important prudential reasons are cited to support the view that
minor crimes may or should be tried summarily. Essentially, two policy argu-
ments, both based upon a balancing of adverse interests, are advanced. First,
there is a suggestion that summary trial of petty offenders, by alleviating some
of the congestion of jury dockets, expedites the trials of persons accused of serious
crimes and thereby benefits them." Second, the public benefit accruing from
speedy and inexpensive summary trials outweighs the comparatively small preju-
dice to the petty offender resulting from his being deprived of trial by jury."
Although, as Kaye rejoins, this particular weighing of social and individual inter-
ests inverts some professed American values, this is less extraordinary than it may
first appear. Notwithstanding the much touted primacy of the individual in the
American hierarchy of values, courts quite commonly prefer social over conflicting
individual interests when judicial choices are cast in that way rather than in
terms of competing social interests.' 4 And, of course, such a result follows if the
public interest is perceived as significant and the private interest as trivial - an
assumption which defenders of the petty offense exception easily make.
Few critics of the petty offense doctrine, for all their reservations respecting
its historical and policy credentials, have renounced it completely, however. Most
have recoiled at the prospect of additional congestion and delays in the adminis-
tration of both criminal and civil justice which might result from extension of the
right to jury trial to every federal criminal proceeding, to say nothing of every
state prosecution. This concern cannot be lightly dismissed, even* though the
waiver rate with reference to trials of petty offenders would in all likelihood be
high, as it has been in those jurisdictions now granting jury trials in minor crim-
inal cases.'
Even Kaye, the most articulate critic of the petty offense exception, ultimately
30 In neither article III nor the sixth amendment is there any language differentiating
between grave and petty offenses, but the guarantee of grand jury indictment in the fifth
amendment is explicitly limited to prosecutions "for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime." See
United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
31 See Kaye, supra note 29.
32 Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 28 at 976.
33 See Katz v. Eldridge, 97 N.J.L. 123, 117 A. 841 '(1922).
34 Compare Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
35 Until 1969, California provided for trial by jury in all criminal cases, regardless of the
penalty. While the waiver rate was high, the burden upon municipal courts was nevertheless
substantial. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA REPORT 15-16 (1967).
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temporizes by suggesting a reformulation of the test for distinguishing between
offenses for'which jury trials are guaranteed and those which may be prosecuted
summarily. The test that he proposes would focus essentially upon the type of
penalty which the law imposes rather than the intrinsic gravity of the crime or
the severity of the authorized punishment for its commission. Thus, he argues
that the jury trial provisions of article III and of the sixth amendment are con-
trolling in prosecutions where the liberty of the accused is at stake. Conversely,
where the property of the defendant is jeopardized - i.e., where the statute im-
poses only a fine or forfeiture for the offense charged -these guarantees do not
apply, although the civil jury guarantee of the seventh amendment may afford
limited protection in such situations."8 There is a suggestion of this distinction -
as between offenses involving a deprivation of liberty upon conviction and those
punishable only by fines - in some earlier language of the Supreme Court, par-
ticularly in Callan v. WilsonY And it was revived by Justices Black and Douglas
in a recent dissenting opinion:
I do not deny that there might possibly be some offenses charged for which
the punishment is so miniscule that it might be thought of as petty. But
to my way of thinking, when a man is charged by a governmental unit with
conduct for which the Government can impose a penalty of imprisonment
for any amount of time, I doubt if I could ever hold it petty.35
However seductive, for its libertarian ramifications, this particular accom-
modation of the right to jury trial with the exigencies of administering justice
may be, such a formulation of the test is more ingenious than convincing. The
historical evidence for construing the jury trial guarantees as applicable only to
prosecutions where life or liberty is at stake, which Kaye attempts to document,
is probably even more tenuous than the historical argument which he so ably
rebutted."' Moreover, some of the policy implications of this distinction could
36 Kaye, supra note 29, at 275-76.
37 127 U.S. 540 at 549.
38 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 160 (1969). See also Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring in part).
39 According to Kaye:[I]t is only where personal liberty is involved that the jury guarantees of Article
III and Amendment VI come into play. Alexander Hamilton said that the friends
of the plan of the Federal Convention; who as to this matter constituted the more
conservative group, regarded the trial by jury "'as a valuable safeguard to liberty."
Hamilton's further elucidation of the topic in, The Federalist clearly shows that thejury assurance of Article III was designed, in accordance with the attitude of the
time, to secure personal liberty, and that, the protection of private property was left
to Congressional statutory regulation. Kaye, supra note 29, at 274-75.
The foregoing conclusion, however, is hardly supported by Hamilton's statement, which
was as follows:
[I] cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence of
liberty, and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary
methods of prosecuting pretended offences, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial despotism;
and these have all relation to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal
cases, aided by the habeas -corpus act, seems therefore to be alone concerned in the
question. And both of these are provided for, in the most ample manner, in the plan
of the convention. TnE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 522 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton).
A less tortured reading of Hamilton's statement suggests that he was simply chiding critics
of the Constitution for their exaggerated emphasis upon the importance of trial by jury in civil
cases, for which the document .made no explicit provision.
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prove exceedingly troublesome. To circumvent the jury trial guarantee, govern-
ments might specify fines instead of imprisonment for various offenses, but it is
obvious that these too could be oppressive. In the spectrum of criminal punish-
ments there is probably a point for nearly everyone at which a fine, because of the
amount involved, becomes more onerous than a relatively short jail sentence.
And what of the criminal defendant who upon conviction is unable to pay the
assessed fine? Would the prospect that the indigent defendant will be imprisoned
under a conversion statute entitle him to trial by jury while a defendant charged
with the same offense and able to pay a fine could be tried summarily?4"
III
If the petty offense exception to the jury trial guarantees of article III and
the sixth amendment is to be retained as constitutional docrine, a more sensitive
and comprehensive test than has been applied is needed to preserve fundamental
constitutional values. The exception itself and the tests by which it has been
implemented have been defended upon the basis of history and as a judicial ac-
commodation of competing interests, but neither ground provides altogether per-
suasive support for the prevailing doctrine. A closer reading of history and a
more perceptive application of the balancing test suggest that, as a minimum,
the right to trial by jury should extend to all criminal prosecutions in which
substantial first amendment claims are asserted by the accused in defense of his
activity, even though the crime with which he is charged is not intrinsically grave
and the penalty which may be imposed is relatively light.
Historically, trial by jury in criminal prosecutions has been tied closely to
freedom from governmental oppression. This association was acknowledged by
Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST, and it was reaffirmed by the Court in Duncan.
Although the freedom which trial by jury was understood to protect was no
doubt a generalized conception, it had acquired, by the time the Constitution
was adopted, a special meaning with reference to civil liberty, specifically as a
safeguard of political expression and of religious conscience. The constricted
common law definition of freedom of speech and of the press as merely freedom
from previous restraints, which was authoritatively stated by Blackstone, re-
mained intact and virtually unquestioned during the American Revolution and
the formative years preceding and immediately following adoption of the Con-
stitution.41 But throughout the eighteenth century there was recurrent agitation
for modification of prosecutorial and judicial procedures in seditious libel cases-
the cases in which freedom of expression was most directly imperiled. Both in
England and America the most insistent demands of eighteenth-century reform-
ers were for judicial recognition of the truth of the published matter as an ade-
quate defense and for investing the petty jury, whose then limited function in
sedition cases was to decide upon the fact of publication by the accused, with
40 See Winters v. Beck, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41 See L. Ls-vy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 13-15 (1960) [hereinafter cited as LEvY].
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the power to render a general verdict."2 These demands were not simply the
product of heady speculation. The possibility that lay jurors might frustrate
oppressive prosecutions and temper the application of harsh laws had been con-
firmed by experience. Instances in which grand juries refused to return indict-
ments against errant publishers were fairly numerous."' And there were a few
dramatic and highly publicized trials, such as that of Peter Zenger, where petty
juries, despite the restricted role ascribed to them in sedition cases, rendered
acquittal verdicts." Thus, Americans of the eighteenth century had some reason
to regard the right to trial by jury as, in Hamilton's words, either "a valuable
safeguard to liberty or as the very palladium of free government."45 Exceptions
to the jury trial mandates of the Constitution which fail to take into account the
close historical nexus between these guarantees and freedom of expression are,
at best, of doubtful validity.
The case for reshaping the petty offense doctrine so as to extend the right to
jury trial to all criminal prosecutions involving first amendment claims does not,
however, rest primarily upon a new reading of history. Precisely the same con-
clusion is even more strongly indicated by a sensitive application of the balancing
test which judges and commentators have invoked in support of the current
doctrine. Provision for summary trials, as we have seen, has been defended upon
the ground that the prejudice to the petty offender occasioned by such procedures
is outweighed by the public interest in the expeditious administration of justice.
In times of soaring crime rates, congested jury dockets, and long delays in the
disposition of civil and criminal cases, this asserted public interest should not be
minimized, even though constitutionally less suspect but politically more painful
means of alleviation may be available.
At best, constitutional doctrine representing an accommodation of diverse
interests and values is tenable only insofar as relevant interests and values are fully
discerned and then placed upon the judicial scales. The balancing purporting to
sustain current doctrine has been extremely simplistic, but perhaps for ordinary
prosecutions, the prejudice to the accused occasioned by summary trials as against
the public interest in the efficient administration of justice may be regarded as
the principal parameters for judicial doctrine-making with reference to the jury
trial guarantees of the Constitution. Moreover, if these are the interests to be
accommodated, rational distinctions may be made in terms of the intrinsic gravity
of the offense and the severity of the authorized punishment.
Even if the current doctrine is satisfactory with respect to ordinary prosecu-
tions, it is deficient with reference to criminal proceedings against persons assert-
ing first amendment rights. This is not to argue that the interest of the individual
defendant in such cases is necessarily more important than in prosecutions where
no such right is claimed. What is asserted is that prosecutions in which defendants
plead first amendment rights, as the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly ad-
42 Id. at 171-72. Levy attributes the emergence of a broad libertarian theory of the scope
of the first amendment, a theory repudiating the common law of seditious libel, not to the
framers of the amendment but to Jeffersonians in reaction to prosecutions under the Sedition
Act of 1798.
43 Id. at 258-59.
44 See V. BURANELLI, THE TRAL oF PETER ZENGER '(1957).
45 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-22 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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monished, involve social interests of transcendent importance, which, as trans-
lated into constitutional values, are entitled to jealous protection." Such pro-
tection may be afforded, of course, by attributing broad substantive meaning to
first amendment freedoms as a matter of law. But solicitude for first amendment
freedoms has been evidenced as well by judicial insistence upon special pro-
cedures whereby these liberties may be defended against infringement. Among
the decided cases involving first amendment claims are those in which the Court
reallocated the burden of proof4" and modified requisites of standing,48 standards
of permissible statutory vagueness,49 rules of abstention," and principles of
statutory construction."' At the same time the Court, while not extending any
procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights to first amendment cases on that ac-
count alone,52 has applied some of those guarantees with extraordinary rigor in
such cases."
The social interest in protecting freedom of expression implicit in cases
having a first amendment dimension is neither diminished nor attenuated by the
consideration that the offense is petty, whether the applicable test is the nature
of the offense or the severity of the maximum penalty which the law prescribes.
Prosecutions for such low visibility crimes as breach of the peace, obstruction of
passageways, and conducting a public meeting without a permit, to name but
a few, may have serious deterrent effects upon the exercise of first amendment
liberties, to say nothing of those instituted under statutes and ordinances which
explicitly restrict speech and publication.54 At the same time, it is arguable, in
terms of the very standards now utilized by the Court, that the social interest in
deterring the prohibited conduct is relatively low. The fact that an offense
carries only a slight punishment and is not intrinsically grave-that it is, let us
say, defined by municipal ordinance rather than by general penal statute, or is
malum prohibitum rather than malum in se-may signify a minimal social interest
in suppressing the proscribed activity. Such an interest, of course, may very well
suffice to sustain the substantive validity of ordinary penal legislation as well as
46 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
47 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
48 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
49 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965).
50 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
51 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) ; Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
52 There have been suggestions to that effect in a few minority opinions. See, e.g., Jacobel-
lis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199-203 (1964) (Warren and Clark, JJ., dissenting); Kingsley v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957) (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
With respect to most of the procedural specifics of the Bill of Rights, however, no special
problem concerning their applicability in first amendment cases arises, for they are generally
binding in all criminal prosecutions regardless of the gravity of the offense. But the right to
assistance of counsel, in the sense of the right of the indigent defendant to have counsel pro-
vided is guaranteed only in felony prosecutions. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
See also Dejoseph v. Connecticut, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966) (Stewart, J., joined by
Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting), Winters v. Beck, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
53 See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAxv. L. REv. 518 (1970).
54 Certain offenses of this kind may very well be deemed petty by current definition. For
example, in eighteen states at least some offenses against obscenity laws are only punishable by
fine or imprisonment for six months or less; consequently, these qualify as petty offenses under
the doctrine of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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provision for summary procedures in the trial of offenders, where no competing
social interest can be asserted. But a countervailing interest, as the Court has
repeatedly stated, is present when first amendment rights are in contention, and,
if this interest is accorded appropriate weight, quite different conclusions seem to
be indicated.
IV
The proposition that the constitutional right to trial by jury should be
granted in all prosecutions in which substantial first amendment claims are
asserted has thus far presupposed that such an extension of the right would, in
fact, subserve the social interest in freedom of expression. This presupposition, of
course, is not incontestable,55 and, whatever may be the weaknesses of existing
constitutional doctrine, the case for modification should not be permitted to rest
upon unquestioned assumptions.
Critics of trial by jury repeatedly cite the failures of juries to protect political
offenders and spokesmen for unpopular causes. They remind us that prosecu-
tions under the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 resulted, with a single
exception, in guilty verdicts, even though juries were empowered, under that
legislation, to render general verdicts.5" Moreover, in later periods (e.g., during
World War I and its aftermath), the jury's record as a protector of free expression
was unimpressive.5" Such criticism, however, fails to take into full account the
confluence of popular and official hysteria at these times. When both the people
and their government are caught up by the rhetoric of national survival, expe-
rience indicates that neither judges nor juries are likely to be dependable bulwarks
against oppression. More important still, the tarnished civil liberties record of
juries, which critics of the institution cite, is a record compiled when first amend-
ment freedoms were narrowly conceived and when juries were even less represen-
tative than now of a cross section of the whole community. There is no substantial
evidence that the civil liberties records of judges, particularly at the trial court
level, have been any better in prosecutions in which the right to jury trial was
denied or had been waived.
In the past three decades, as we know, first amendment freedoms have been
interpreted expansively. The latitude of these guarantees is judicially determined,
and the court properly has the exclusive function of deciding whether a statute
restrictive of first amendment freedoms is valid upon its face.5" If the statute
is not invalid, the court performs - explicitly when a jury is used, but often
implicitly in bench trials - the vital function of defining 1the limits which the
first amendment imposes upon the application of the statute to the defendant's
conduct.59 The court also decides whether the evidence, as a matter of law, is
sufficient, in light of pertinent constitutional limitations, to sustain a conviction
55 See Monaghan, supra note 53, at 526-32.
56 . LEVY, supra note 41, at 131.,
57 See, Z. CHAVEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 70-73 (1948); Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury, 21 U. CH!. L. REv. 386, 414-15 (1954).
58 .. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1968).
59 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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under the statuteY' Extension of the right to trial by jury to prosecutions involv-
ing first amendment claims would not detract from the safeguards now afforded
by trial and appellate courts. The fact-finding function is essentially a contingent
one which, especially when performed by a jury rather than by the trial court,
may afford an additional barrier against dubious restraints in the twilight zone
between liberty and license.
There is, of course, no assurance that a particular jury will be more sensitive
to the first amendment claims of an accused than the judge would be, but the
jury constitutes a further institutional check upon judges who are unreceptive
to such assertions of right. We now have substantial empirical evidence that in
a significant number of cases judges and juries differ as to what the verdict should
be.6 ' Although these disagreements may operate in both directions, with the
judge being either less or more sympathetic than the jury toward the defendant,
"when only pure fact-finding is involved, the jury tends to give more weight than
the judge tothe norm that there should be no conviction without proof beyond
a reasonable doubt."62 In other words, the jury tends to resolve doubts in favor
of the criminal defendant, and, incidentally, and perhaps unconsciously, in favor
of the defendant's asserted freedom. Where "the jury does more than find the
facts... depending on how one looks at it, the jury can be said to do equity, to
legislate interstitially, to implement its own norms, or to exhibit bias."6 " It thus
performs the time-honored function of providing some popular, common-sense
leavening in the application of the law within the community.
Now this may very well mean that some juries will render verdicts which
are in derogation of first amendment rights. And, with respect to this possibility,
the fact that the precedential thrust of jury verdicts is weak and their corrosive
effects consequently limited,64 although somewhat palliative, is not completely
reassuring. If there is a possibility, however, that the jury will be less sensitive to
the defendant's first amendment claims than the trial judge would be, so too is
there a possibility that it will be more so. While positive evidence that juries on
the whole are more or less favorable to first amendment claims than trial judges
would be interesting and useful, such evidence is not crucial to a determination
of whether the social interest in freedom of expression would be subserved by
extending the right to trial by jury to all prosecutions involving assertions of first
amendment rights. To state the matter more explicitly, the libertarian tendencies
of the jury, as compared with those of the judge, are of much less significance
here than is the fact that in some cases and at some times some juries will react
more favorably than do some judges toward criminal defendants who raise first
amendment claims. Extension of the right to trial by jury to all criminal cases
involving such claims would afford the defendant a practical choice between
summary trial and trial by his peers - a choice which, as part of the defense
60 See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 '(1969).
61 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 55-81.
62 Id. at 494.
63 Id.
64 Where the right to trial by jury exists, waiver by the defendant may, of course, be con-
ditioned upon the consent of the prosecutor and the court. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24 (1965). In practice, however, the prosecutor rarely objects to attempted waiver, and, if
such objection would deny the defendant an impartial trial, it might be held inefficacious.
Id. at 37-38.
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strategy, could be made pragmatically in light of the facts of the particular case,
the temper of the community, the assessed predilections of the trial judge, and
other considerations. As the law now stands, the choice between summary and
jury trial is often left to the prosecutor alone, because many proscribed activities
which are arguably exercises of first amendment freedoms may be prosecuted
under any of several statutes and ordinances. By electing to prosecute for a lesser
offense, which by current definition is petty, the prosecutor may preclude trial
by jury.s
The case for extending the right to jury trial to criminal prosecutions involv-
ing first amendment defenses does not, however, rest solely upon the libertarian
effects which may be produced. In constitutional jurisprudence, as in no other
area of the law, symbolism is important. If, as we have been reminded by the
Court, first amendment freedoms are the preconditions of an open society, this
in itself may be reason enough for enlisting the whole range of constitutionally
mandated criminal procedures for their support and vindication. Moreover, this
abstract symbolism has an immediately practical aspect as well. At a time when
criminal convictions involving the conduct of the politically disaffected are decried
as the harshly repressive outputs of the "establishment" and the "system"- when
both the law and the judicial process are denounced as inimical to the "people"-
the credibility of such ideological fulminations can only be augmented, and the
alienation of dissenters deepened, by resort to summary proceedings without the
consent of the accused. The judge epitomizes the establishment, particularly
when the law-declaring and the fact-finding functions are mandatorily intermixed
in his person. The jury, on the other hand, "enters as a stranger and leaves as a
stranger.""e Interposition of the jury, as a reflex of community values, in the
adjudicatory process affords the judiciary a measure of insulation and, in this
way, may buttress respect for the judicial process and for the rule of law.
65 This resembles, in one important respect, the prosecutorial discretion which would have
existed if the Supreme Court had approved court-martial jurisdiction over overseas civilian
dependents of military personnel in noncapital cases. This consideration was cited by the
Court when it rejected the distinction between capital and noncapital cases as a proper basis
for defining the right to trial in an article III court. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton, 361 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1960).
66 See Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological Analysis, 1966 Wis. L. Rlv. 820, 830.
